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THE ROLE OF BEYOND ZERO EMISSIONS
IN THE AUSTRALIAN CLIMATE DEBATE
Adam Lucas

Early in 2011, the Journal of Australian Political Economy (JAPE)
published a special issue titled, ‘Challenging Climate Change’. It brought
together a number of papers by climate change researchers and activists
who had been invited during 2009 to contribute their perspectives to a
one-day forum covering four different aspects of the climate change
debate: carbon markets and the regulation of renewable energy;
technological pathways toward sustainability versus a low-tech, ecosufficiency future; climate justice; and the experiences of a variety of
environmental NGOs in campaigning for policy reform (Goodman &
Rosewarne, 2011: 7). The aim of the forum and those who organized it
was to stimulate a more robust debate about climate change policy in
Australia and the international negotiations focused on reducing
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
(Goodman & Rosewarne, 2011: 5).
Contributors to the Special Issue represented a relatively broad spectrum
of environmental perspectives, from those promoting reformist, social
democratic principles, to those favouring resistance to market-based
policies based on eco-socialist, eco-feminist and anarchist principles.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a notable feature of the Special Issue is an
unresolved tension between authors focusing on the reform of policies
governing electricity generation, transmission and distribution as a means
of stimulating investment in renewable energy infrastructure and driving
rapid emissions reductions (Buckman, 2011; Diesendorf, 2011), and
those critiquing the tendency of the Australian climate movement to
embrace ecological modernisation discourse over the last ten to fifteen
years in developing its core strategies and policies: a form of discourse
arguably favoured by the first two authors (Salleh, 2011; Goodman,
2011; Pearse, 2011).

The main thrust of the criticisms made by the second group of authors is
that the kinds of climate solutions being supported and promoted by a
number of Australian NGOs and peak bodies are primarily technological
solutions informed by the same kind of technological optimism
characteristic of earlier forms of modernity premised on an infinite
growth paradigm. They argue, furthermore, that these approaches do not
incorporate notions of ecological limits or sufficiency and are therefore
inadequate to the task of transforming societies to overcome the root
cause of the problem: the capitalist domination of nature. All three
authors single out one particular environmental NGO, Beyond Zero
Emissions, as an exemplar of the kinds of problems which they see in the
Australian environmental movement’s policy recommendations around
anthropogenic climate change.
In the spirit of the forum which inspired the Special Issue, and in the
interests of stimulating further debate, I feel I have a responsibility to
respond to these criticisms, both as the former Sydney Convenor of
Beyond Zero Emissions, and as a contributor to the organization’s
ongoing research and public education agenda. Before I do so, however,
I should very briefly outline the history of BZE, as well as its aims and
strategy.
Beyond Zero Emissions Incorporated (BZE) is a not-for-profit research
and education organisation which focuses on developing detailed plans
for implementing solutions to anthropogenic climate change. BZE’s
focus is the transformation of Australian society, from an economy based
primarily on the exploitation of fossil fuels and the unsustainable use of
natural resources to one which is primarily geared toward the sustainable
use of human and natural resources, powered solely by renewable
energy. Its Zero Carbon Australia 2020 research project is aimed at
developing climate change policy solutions that are consistent with the
latest climate science. As one of the highest polluting nations per capita
and a major exporter of fossil fuels, the science clearly indicates that
Australia needs to rapidly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to zero.
BZE draws on the work of scores of dedicated volunteers with
professional expertise in engineering, the physical and social sciences,
the arts and humanities, and media and journalism, many of whom have
worked or are still working in the corporate sector.
A small executive team on a flat pay structure coordinates the activities
of a large group of volunteers. It also partners with a small group of

university researchers, most of whom are based in the Energy Research
Institute at the University of Melbourne. The organization is non-partisan
and receives no government funding, relying on donations from the
public and sales of its publications to fund its activities. It hosts a website
(www.beyondzeroemissions.org) and a weekly radio show on 3CR in
Melbourne. It is also active in the national and international media, and
in training members to promote its activities through public speaking
events and other fora.
BZE was founded in Melbourne in 2006 by Matthew Wright and Adrian
Whitehead. Wright was a former IT specialist for Reuters, while
Whitehead was an experienced forest activist. The pair founded the
organization because they felt at that point that the mainstream
environmental movement was not advocating the level of climate action
required by the science. From very modest beginnings in Kindness
House, Fitzroy, BZE now has offices in Melbourne, Sydney and
Brisbane, as well as active volunteers in and around Canberra,
Newcastle, Adelaide, Perth, Cairns and Townsville with several thousand
people on its mailing list and around 600 active volunteers.
BZE’s ongoing Zero Carbon Australia 2020 research project is aimed at
developing fully costed transition plans for moving Australia to zero
emissions within ten years using commercially available technology. The
project covers the six portfolio areas of energy, buildings, transport, land
use, industrial processes and coal exports. BZE’s Zero Carbon Australia
Stationary Energy Plan was the first of six publications to be completed
in June 2010 (Wright & Hearps, 2010). The buildings, transport and land
use plans are currently close to completion and should be ready for
publication within the next six months.
Because the stationary energy sector is by far the largest contributor to
Australia’s GHG emissions, BZE’s primary focus over the last few years
has been to determine the right mix of energy efficiency measures and
commercially proven renewable energy technology which will enable
Australia to build a zero emission energy sector within ten years. The
Zero Carbon Australia Stationary Energy Plan (the Plan) is the fruit of
that research.
The Plan is a significant publication for a number of reasons. It is the
first fully costed, technically specified plan for moving a developed
country to 100% renewable energy within ten years using commercially
available technology (Wright & Hearps, 2010). It was produced through

the cooperation of more than forty volunteer researchers at a fraction of
the cost which would be incurred by a government department or
corporation pursuing similar research, and has received endorsements
from scientists, academics, policy-makers, politicians and business
people from across the political spectrum.
The Plan clearly demonstrates that Australia can meet the vast majority
of its energy needs using renewable energy technologies that are already
proven in the field and which are currently commercially available. At an
estimated cost of $370 billion over ten years, the Plan details how a mix
of geographically dispersed windpower and concentrated solar thermal
power with salt storage (i.e., ‘baseload renewable energy’), combined
with stringent but achievable energy efficiency measures, can meet the
needs of a growing population and totally replace fossil fuel use (mainly
oil for transport, and gas and coal for industrial uses and electricity
generation). Costing for the Plan was assessed and verified by Jack
Actuarial Consultants, while the technical specifications were checked
and endorsed by the international energy consultancy, Sinclair Knight
Merz.
Given the scale and audacity of its claims, it is not surprising that
criticisms of the Zero Carbon Australia plan have been frequent and
vociferous since its publication. For example, the pro-nuclear advocates
involved in producing the website, Brave New Climate, have criticized it
for radically underestimating the cost of constructing the proposed
infrastructure, and have queried a number of the technical assumptions
involved (Nicholson & Lang, 2010). The zero growth proponent, Ted
Trainer, has likewise argued that it will be far too expensive to convert
Australia’s (and the world’s) energy-intensive society to renewables, and
that the intermittency of solar and wind power are currently
insurmountable problems (Trainer, 2011). Staffers in the office of the
Federal Minister for Climate Change, Greg Combet, have told
constituents that ‘the Government does not consider the proposal set out
in the BZE plan as achievable or cost effective. The best way to address
climate change and reduce Australia's carbon pollution is to put a price
on pollution – a carbon price’ (Catley, 2011). Responses to Trainer’s and
Brave New Climate’s substantive criticisms can be found on BZE’s
website under ‘Frequently Asked Questions’. Minister Combet’s office is
yet to provide any evidence in support of its position.

Although the aforementioned criticisms share the view that
implementation of the Plan will be far more expensive than BZE has
calculated, none have been able to substantiate this view, nor have any of
them raised any credible points about its technical details. However,
Ariel Salleh, James Goodman and Rebecca Pearse marshal quite
different arguments in support of their critique. What unites them is the
charge that BZE is ‘an exemplar of ecological modernisation’ (Salleh,
2011: 125).
Salleh opens her critique with the observations that the Plan was
endorsed by a number of individuals and international organizations with
questionable records on social and environmental issues, and that the
Sydney launch featured ‘ten men in suits’. In response to the first of
these observations, BZE deliberately sought endorsements from
prominent scientists, environmentalists, politicians, policy-makers and
business people from across the political spectrum as a means of
undercutting criticism from some on the Right, who we anticipated
would argue that the plan is an impractical and unachievable example of
leftist central planning, as well as some on the Left, who we anticipated
would argue that the Plan is another example of technocratic social
engineering that will further contribute to environmental degradation.
Although this strategy did lend the Plan credibility in some circles, it did
not prevent critics from questioning the nature of the endorsements
and/or the motivations of some of the parties who endorsed the plan. Nor
did it undercut any of the anticipated counter-arguments and criticisms.
In response to Salleh’s second observation, it is true that the Sydney
launch of the Plan in August 2010 featured ‘ten men in suits’ on stage at
Sydney Town Hall. As one of the organizers for this event, I should point
out that considerable efforts were made to secure the participation of
several women speakers, including Senator Christine Milne and Lord
Mayor Clover Moore. However, due to prior commitments, none of the
invited women speakers could participate. Time constraints related to
organizing and promoting the event meant that an all-male panel was the
best we could manage in the circumstances, although none of us were
particularly pleased with this outcome. Nevertheless, with minimal
publicity or media support, we managed to almost fill Sydney Town Hall
on a cold, wintry night: a clear indication of widespread public interest in
BZE’s positive message. I should also note that the initial launch of the
plan in Canberra on 22 June 2010 was undertaken by Senators Christine

Milne, Judith Troeth and Nick Xenophon, and subsequent launches in
Brisbane, Adelaide, Hobart and Perth were gender balanced.
A third criticism which Salleh makes of the Plan is that BZE envisages a
public-private joint venture company rolling out the proposed energy
infrastructure, even though no mention was made of this at the Sydney
launch and such a proposal is not discussed anywhere in the Plan. In fact,
BZE has deliberately remained agnostic about how the Plan might be
financed and implemented because we believe that this is a decision that
needs to be properly debated and discussed by the Australian public.
Perhaps the most substantive criticism levelled at the Plan by Salleh is
her assertion that ‘the Zero plan may cut carbon emissions from energy
generation facilities but it will do nothing to stop the extractive assault on
the society-nature metabolism’ (ibid.: 126). Putting aside for one moment
the issue of whether the second part of this assertion is credible, the
primary aim of the Plan is to radically reduce Australia’s GHG emissions
from stationary energy and transport, which constitute half of the
country’s total emissions (Australian Government, n.d.). If it achieves
that aim (and most members of BZE are under no illusions that doing so
will require extraordinary commitment and perseverance), BZE will have
been at least partially successful and therefore vindicated in its approach.
With respect to the claim that the Plan ‘will do nothing to stop the
extractive assault on the society-nature metabolism’, I am not aware of
any existing proposal for climate change mitigation that does not involve
some significant additional use of resources to build the requisite low
carbon infrastructure. And while it is true that the construction of the
proposed infrastructure does require the mining, manufacturing and
recycling of considerable quantities of steel, glass, salt and cement, all of
these resource requirements have been calculated and contextualized
within Australia’s current production levels. Were the Plan to be
implemented, the environmental impact of producing these and other
materials in Australia would be considerably reduced, as the case studies
on zero carbon steel and aluminium manufacturing in the Plan clearly
indicate (Wright & Hearps, 2010: 72-4, 152-3). BZE argues that
Australia’s development of this expertise could also be exported to
similarly reduce such impacts in other parts of the world.
With respect to minimizing resource extraction more generally, BZE
supports the creation and maintenance of closed loop production cycles
along the lines of those proposed by McDonough and Braungart (2002).

However, we recognize that in a 21st century economy, some raw
commodities cannot be sourced from post-consumer waste streams and
will therefore require some continuation of mining activities. In those
circumstances, BZE supports world’s best-practice mine management
and site remediation, as well as continued research and development on
alternatives to non-renewable resource extraction. Given BZE’s position
on these issues, it is difficult to envisage on what basis it can be argued
that implementation of the Plan will do nothing to reduce natural
resource extraction in Australia or elsewhere.
Salleh also charges BZE with overlooking how ‘everything is connected
to everything else’ like other ‘[e]cological modernisers grounded in the
economic paradigm’ (Salleh, 2011: 126). However, the fact that BZE
continues to develop zero carbon plans for buildings, transport, land use
and manufacturing at the very least indicates an holistic awareness that
virtually every aspect of Australian society will need to be transformed to
radically reduce the country’s ecological footprint. Her observation that
BZE is ‘grounded in the economic paradigm’ suggests that the
organization’s research is premised on neoclassical/neoliberal economic
principles, although this is not a reasonable assessment of BZE’s
thinking on economic matters, and is not based on any assessment of its
published research or public statements on this topic. Indeed, as I will
argue at greater length in a separate essay currently in preparation, such
observations are based on an illegitimate conflation of neoliberal market
fundamentalism with a broad spectrum of reformist positions which are
premised on radically reducing resource and energy consumption and the
production of toxic materials and wastes.
On several other points, Salleh takes BZE to task on technical issues
which are simply not valid. She argues, for example, that the
concentrated solar thermal (CST) component of the Plan ‘entails a
radical transformation of the landscape by tree clearing, drainage, and
levelling’ (Salleh, 2011: 126). However, all of the sites envisaged for
solar thermal plant construction involve degraded or salinated farm land
which has already been cleared, in areas of very low rainfall with little
remaining ecological or heritage value, and minimal requirements for site
works. If the topography of suitable sites was found to be irregular, the
‘Big Dish’ solar mirror technology developed by the Australian National
University could be deployed to avoid any need to level it. Salleh also
claims that ‘[a]n accumulation of mirrors across a large field is likely to
function as a massive radiant “hot plate”, impacting on the surrounding

atmosphere and affecting the stability of local weather’ (ibid.). This
claim is purely speculative and based on no empirical evidence. No such
effects have been noted in any of the solar power towers that have been
constructed around the world to date. In fact, the heliostat field focuses
the sun’s energy on the receiver at the top of the power tower and will do
little or nothing to heat the surrounding atmosphere.
Another resource-based criticism of the Plan made by Salleh relates to
the water requirements for operating the proposed CST plants. Although
she acknowledges that they will ‘use less water than power generation by
fossil fuels’, she argues that the rivers from which it is envisaged this
water will be taken will increasingly be regarded as more valuable for
food production (ibid.). What she does not mention is that all the water
requirements for the dry-cooled CST plants have been fully costed and
calculated based on the proposed locations: most of the required water
would be used for washing the plants’ mirrors, and each plant would use
less than 10% of the water required for a coal-fired power station with
equivalent generating capacity (Wright & Hearps, 2010: 148-151).
Considering that Australia is the driest continent on earth, any means of
generating energy that uses 90% less water than the existing coal-fired
technology should arguably be receiving far more serious attention than
Salleh appears prepared to contemplate.
James Goodman is similarly critical of BZE and what he calls ‘ecomodernisation’, although his contribution to ‘Challenging Climate
Change’ does recognize a diversity of approaches to ecological
modernisation, ranging from ‘weaker’ to ‘stronger’ versions (Goodman,
2011: 144-8; 149-52). He opens his argument by stating that it was a
widespread acceptance of the authority of climate scientists as
represented by the IPCC that not only led to the international consensus
concerning the reality of human-induced climate change, but also to the
(supposed) ‘near-consensus that technological change, and in particular,
renewable energy, offers the required solution’ to it. Although he rightly
questions a tendency amongst some in the movement to see the
transformation of technology as being a sufficient response to the
problem, he conflates ‘the headline demand’ of participants for 100%
renewable energy at the March 2009 Climate Summit in Canberra with
this kind of technocratic (and reductionist) outlook (ibid.: 144-5).
Presumably because he sees the Zero Carbon Australia plan as providing
a focal point and rationale for such a technocratic outlook, Goodman

questions whether the Plan is in any way sustainable. He points to its
acceptance of a projected 40% increase in electricity demand between
2008 and 2020 as emblematic of its acceptance of an unlimited growth
economy (Goodman, 2011: 146), because it argues ‘this could be morethan accommodated by a fifty per cent increase [in] efficiency measures
that would come with a shift to 100% renewables’ (ibid.). There was, in
fact, a very good strategic reason for modelling the plan to incorporate a
40% increase in electricity usage by 2020. Both official population
projections and electricity usage figures indicated that an increase of this
magnitude was highly likely, although recent reductions in electricity
demand make those projections appear less likely (Parkinson, 2012).
BZE therefore used these figures as a means of establishing the
credibility of the Plan within government, business and industry circles,
because we believe that we need to convince as many people as possible
within these sectors that the proposal is technologically feasible,
economically affordable and logistically possible. This has been, and will
remain, BZE’s aim, regardless of whether we agree with official
projections: they are useful tools of persuasion for those with more
conservative mindsets.
Nevertheless, Goodman’s primary concern about BZE’s strategy appears
to be that it is ‘embracing technology as the answer to climate change’
(ibid.), in much the same way as other ‘eco-modernisers’, even though
this is not a fair characterization of BZE’s position. BZE is under no
illusions that technological change is going to ‘fix’ anthropogenic
climate change. We all know that cultural and political changes are also
necessary. The founders of the organization made a pragmatic decision
when they first formed BZE to focus on the kinds of technology and
infrastructure changes that would need to be made in order for us to
achieve a zero emission society in Australia, to prove to critics and
sceptics that such changes are, as previously stated, technologically
feasible, economically affordable and logistically possible. This was
primarily because no-one else (including those in government) had ever
tried to do this in any kind of rigorous fashion. BZE’s support of, and
participation in, the broader social and cultural strategies being
developed by the NGOs which endorsed the Transition Decade was to
complement that broader agenda with facts and figures that could be
deployed against those who repeatedly tell us that it is simply not
possible for a modern, industrialized economy to make a rapid transition
to zero emissions.

Rebecca Pearse draws on similar arguments to those of Salleh and
Goodman in her critique of BZE’s stationary energy plan. Although she
admits ‘[t]he plethora of NGO published reports meticulously detailing
potential energy scenarios are important means of making the normative
case for decarbonisation’ (there are, in fact, only a handful of such
detailed reports), she argues that ‘establishing the existence of technical
capabilities often begs bigger political questions concerning the nature
and extent of reform sought after’ (Pearse, 2011: 182). She cites recent
reports by Saddler, Diesendorf and Denniss (2004), Teske and Vincent
(2008), and the Zero Carbon Australia plan (Wright & Hearps, 2010) in
support of her claim.
One interpretation of this criticism is that none of the authors of these
reports are concerned with, or actively engaged in, seeking reform of the
current socio-economic system. If this is what Pearse intended to mean, it
should be noted that all of the authors of these reports are seasoned
campaigners who have been seeking to achieve political reforms in
Australia for many years, and in some cases, for decades. While ‘the
nature and extent of reform sought after’ by these various individuals
may not be consistent with Pearse’s vision of reform, there is ample
evidence that they have been so engaged.
An alternative interpretation of this criticism is that these detailed energy
scenarios deliberately avoid entering into discussions of ‘the nature and
extent of reform sought after’. While I cannot speak for the first two
groups of authors, the authors of the Zero Carbon Australia plan did
indeed deliberately avoid discussing larger political issues relating to
socio-economic reform. This was because BZE made a pragmatic
decision some time ago that the only way it was going to achieve
widespread public support for the Plan was to present the case for a
transition to a zero carbon society by focusing on the technical, economic
and resource requirements for making that transition without proscribing
the kinds of policies or political changes that would be needed to achieve
it. In other words, no matter whether the reader is a conservative, liberal,
libertarian, social democrat, socialist or anarchist, they can read the Plan,
make their own judgement about the practicality of its technical,
economic and resource requirements, and decide for themselves whether
they support it. If sufficient numbers of Australians can be persuaded that
the Plan has merit, the practicalities and politics of implementation
would then become the basis for public debate and discussion.

Although Pearse asserts that BZE’s ‘reasoning is explicitly geared
toward the technical problem as they see it, assuming the political agenda
will flow from there’ (Pearse, 2011: 183), BZE has never believed that
its members would not have to make considerable efforts to raise
Australians’ awareness about the possibilities which the Zero Carbon
Australia plan represents. Most of its activities are focused on gaining
more popular support for its research and education agenda through
regular media coverage, speaker presentation training, policy briefings
for decision-makers, and public presentations of its research, all of which
have been successful to date. Our public presentations of the Stationary
Energy Plan, for example, have now reached more than 80,000 people.
These many and varied activities are documented in detail on BZE’s
website.
Because Pearse appears to have relied solely on the Plan for her
assessment of BZE’s activities and political positions, it is perhaps
unsurprising to read her claim that ‘[BZE’s] silence in reference to the
market agenda is deafening’ (ibid.). While the Plan, as previously stated,
makes no observations about the policies BZE believes should be
implemented to support it, the organisation has been quite explicit in its
public statements on this issue over the last eighteen months or so.
For the record, BZE does not support emissions trading in any form, and
only supports a price on carbon on the basis that it provides a platform
upon which to build awareness of the economically externalized costs of
GHG pollution. However, BZE argues that the currently agreed price on
carbon will not drive investment into a zero emission economy because
the level at which it has been set is simply too low, and is unlikely for
political reasons to reach the levels required to drive sufficient
investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy infrastructure
within the required timeframe (Beyond Zero Emissions, 2011). BZE
supports far more direct regulatory interventions which have been proven
to work in other jurisdictions, such as feed-in tariffs and government loan
guarantees for renewable energy investment, although it is yet to publish
any research on these issues. Some members would like to see renationalization of the country’s electricity infrastructure with government
investment driving the transformation, while others see strictly regulated
private sector investment, or financially transparent public-private
partnerships, as acceptable means of achieving the same goals.

Pearse relies on a Sydney Morning Herald report by journalist Paddy
Manning to support her observation that BZE ‘is neither anti-growth nor
anti-business’, and that this is clearly another sign that ‘the logic of
ecological modernisation’ is at work (ibid.: 182-3). While BZE is
certainly not ‘anti-business’, it is highly sceptical about the need for a
continuous growth economy, as is evidenced by ZCA2020’s aspiration to
achieve ‘an indefinite cap on total electricity consumption’, as Goodman
correctly notes (Goodman, 2011: 146).
The task which the Transition Decade, BZE and the various groups and
NGOs affiliated with them have set themselves is to map out what needs
to be done by Australia (and the developed world more generally) in
order to avert the worst possible outcomes from anthropogenic climate
change. None of those who participate in this task believe that it is easy,
or even particularly rewarding. It is therefore rather perplexing to be
placed in the dock by scholars with an ideological axe to grind,
especially when it is quite clear that those who choose to place us there
share many of the same motivations and ideals.
It is also clear that the critical skills of radicals in the movement would
be better directed at more worthy adversaries, such as the fossil fuel and
mining industries, or the senior bureaucrats and politicians occupying
positions of power and authority in the energy, transport, agriculture,
natural resource, infrastructure and planning portfolios and their
associated institutions. Many of these players have proven extremely
effective in combating any significant structural reforms for well over
two decades. But despite (or perhaps because of) the difficulties in
confronting these individuals, groups and institutions, some on the
radical Left seem far more comfortable debating abstractions and
maintaining their ideological purity than directly engaging with the
problems at hand.
Calls for technological transformation such as those articulated by BZE
are not necessarily technocratic in focus, nor do they necessarily
undercut more radical goals. Only the most radical of environmentalists
argue against the proposition that the quickest and most effective strategy
for reducing GHG emissions and averting catastrophic climate change
involves some form of technological transformation, which must of
necessity be at the front and centre of any public debate about the
relevant issues. A focused critique of ecological modernisation theory
and related approaches can help clarify the terms of the debate,

especially with regard to the technological development pathways to
which we collectively commit over the next few decades. Indeed, such a
critique is already well-progressed in Europe (see, e.g., Seyfang & Smith,
2007; Smith, et al., 2010) but it is yet to even begin in Australia.
Nevertheless, few would deny that if the world’s population is to come to
some form of agreement about how best to tackle anthropogenic climate
change, those individuals and organizations who acknowledge the
urgency for decisive action should arguably be doing their best to find
common ground and working together. Building a shared sense of
purpose and cooperative strategies across as broad a range of
environmental NGOs as possible is far more likely to result in positive
outcomes which leverage popular support than is ideological trench
warfare.
We already know from many studies that in order to enter into a
sustainable long-term development phase, most Westerners would have
to consume between one-seventh and one-quarter of the resources that
we currently consume. Most of the poor in the developed world already
meet this criterion. It is therefore clear that current levels of resource
consumption in the developed world and of the growing middle classes
in the newly industrialized nations simply cannot be allowed to continue
if human civilization is to survive the 21st century. It is also clear that
even if these arguments cannot be made with sufficient force to limit
consumption substantially before we reach the natural resource
constraints identified by the authors of The Limits to Growth and
Mankind at the Turning Point in the early 1970s, they will almost
certainly be forced on us over the next few decades as the result of the
peaking of world oil production and human-induced climate change.
Given that our best scientific assessments strongly indicate that
catastrophic changes to the biosphere will occur before we reach most of
the natural resource constraints first identified in detail by the Club of
Rome, concerted and urgent efforts must be made to completely
transform industrial societies’ habitual modes of practice over the next
few decades. Consequently, the questions we must inevitably ask
ourselves are:
•

Is any kind of industrial society actually compatible with the
creation of an ecologically sustainable future for humanity?

•

If so, what kind of industrial society would it be, how would it
function, and what are the developmental pathways we would
have to follow to get there?

•

If not, what kind of society should we be trying to create, how
practical would it be for us to create it, and what are the
implications for current modes of practice and living, and the
populations that are dependent on them?

I am convinced that if we enter into a genuine debate about these
questions and put aside our ideological preconceptions, we can come to
some kind of broad agreement about an appropriate way forward and
begin working together to achieve it.
Adam Lucas is a lecturer in the Science and Technology Studies
Program at the University of Wollongong, and was recently the Sydney
Convenor of Beyond Zero Emissions. His current research is in energy
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